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Abstract
In a model of competing managerial ￿rms I show that the equilibrium number of ￿rms
decreases with uncertainty if entry is relatively more costly than monitoring. The result adds to
the earlier theoretical contributions and is consistent with the available evidence.
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1 Introduction
Models where risk-neutral ￿rms compete in prices predict that greater uncertainty about marginal
costs spurs entry. This is because pro￿t functions are convex in prices, and (expected) prices are
increasing with respect to cost volatility. Yet, the empirical evidence seems to support the opposite
view. Using data on U.S. manufacturing industries over a 30-year period, Ghosal (1996) shows that
greater uncertainty has a negative impact on the number of ￿rms.
To explain this puzzle the existing literature has mainly focused on risk aversion: ￿rms charac-
terized by more risk aversion prefer not to operate in markets featuring high price uncertainty. But,
these models are unable to provide unambiguous and easily testable predictions (e.g., Appelbaum
and Katz, 1986, and Haruna, 1996), and even when they do provide clear-cut results, these are
not in line with the evidence (e.g., Jellal and Wol⁄, 2005). Moreover, these models usually neglect
agency issues and are mute on the interplay between managerial rents, corporate control and entry
￿I thank Denis Gromb, Riccardo Martina and David Martimort for many useful discussions on related topics.
Errors are mine
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1decisions. Modern ￿rms, even small companies, usually feature agency problems that shape man-
agerial incentives and, in turn, the industry structure. What are the drivers of managerial ￿rms￿
entry and exit decisions? What is the impact of organizational and contractual rules on industry
structure?
To address these issues, I analyze a simple managerial model linking entry decisions, corporate
control and uncertainty. My purpose is to emphasize that, even under risk neutrality, a negative re-
lationship between entry and uncertainty obtains when asymmetric information plagues the con￿ ict
between management and control. In a model where pricing, corporate control and entry decisions
are determined endogenously, the e⁄ect of uncertainty on the equilibrium number of ￿rms is shaped
by the relative magnitude of monitoring and entry costs. Using a simple quadratic setting where
managers are privately informed about marginal costs of production, I show that if monitoring
costs are smaller than entry costs, the equilibrium number of ￿rms is decreasing in a measure of
uncertainty, and the converse obtains otherwise.
One main trade-o⁄ shapes this result. First, greater uncertainty increases the average market
price and this spurs entry because sales pro￿ts are convex in prices: a price e⁄ect. Second, greater
uncertainty spurs the information rent that shareholders need to give up in order to induce truthful
information revelation. And the greater is this rent, the lower are total pro￿ts: a rent e⁄ect.
The net e⁄ect depends on the relative magnitude of entry and monitoring costs. If entry costs
are larger than monitoring costs, the rent e⁄ect dominates: more uncertainty spurs information
rents and entry becomes more costly because shareholders get lower returns from their initial in-
vestment. Conversely, if monitoring costs are larger than entry costs, the price e⁄ect dominates.
When monitoring is very costly shareholders have little control on managers: the only way to reduce
the costly information rents is to distort upward the price in bad technological states, so as to make
mimicking less pro￿table. This distortion magni￿es price dispersion and strengthens the positive
e⁄ect of uncertainty on entry.
This result is novel in the theoretical debate on competition and incentives and o⁄ers simple
testable predictions on the link between entry and uncertainty, whereby providing ready to use
guidelines for future empirical work.
2 The model
Consider a Salop (1979) setting where n ￿rms position themselves symmetrically around a circle,
whose perimeter is normalized to 1. The cost of entry is F. Firms produce the same product and
compete in prices. The circle is populated by a continuum of consumers with a uniform density of
1. Each consumer buys one unit of the good. If a consumer located at x 2 (zi;zi+1) purchases from
￿rm i located at zi, his utility is
Vi (x) = v ￿ pi ￿ tx,
2where v is the reserve price of each consumer ￿ i.e., the utility of consuming the most preferred
variety x ￿ and tx is the (linear) disutility associated with consuming this variety.
Following the literature (e.g., Hart, 1983, Schmidt, 1997, and Raith, 2003) I assume that each
￿rm features separation between ownership and control. Shareholders (principals) own all produc-
tive assets but lack the required expertise in managing them, so they need to employ self-interested
managers (agents) to run business in their behalf. Managers set prices and collect pro￿ts, which
are then distributed to shareholders.
Production technologies are linear: marginal costs are determined by the realization of a random




, with Pr(￿) = ￿ and ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ > 0 for all i. Managers privately observe
marginal costs and are protected by limited liability.
Shareholders hire managers before production occurs and uncertainty is resolved, they have full
bargaining power and make take-it-or-leave-it o⁄ers. I use the Revelation Principle to characterize
the set of incentive feasible allocations: once uncertainty is resolved, a message game takes place
within each ￿rm. A managerial contract Ci speci￿es an allocation rule determining: (i) the ￿nal
price, pi, (ii) the dividend to shareholders, Di, and (iii) an auditing scheme, featuring a monitoring
probability, ￿i, and and a (monetary) punishment, Pi, enforced in case a lie is detected. Auditing
the manager is expensive and it costs c(￿i) to shareholders. I shall interpret the probability of
monitoring ￿i as a measure of monitoring (corporate control) intensity.
Shareholders can fully commit to a costly state veri￿cation policy, the contract Ci is a mechanism
Ci = fpi (mi);Di (mi);￿i (mi);Pi (￿i)g(￿i;mi)2￿2
specifying a price, pi (mi), a dividend, Di (mi), and an auditing probability, ￿i (mi), all contingent
on manager i￿ s report mi. The contract also speci￿es a punishment Pi (￿i), contingent on the realized
state of nature, which is enforced whenever ￿i 6= mi. Upon receiving the message mi, shareholders
audit the manager with probability ￿i (mi), discover the state ￿i and, if a lie is detected, the
punishment Pi (￿i) is in￿ icted to the manager.
The game unfolds as follows,
- T = 0. Shareholders decide whether to enter the market. If so, the entry cost F is paid.
- T = 1. Shareholders secretly propose contracts to managers. If an o⁄er is rejected, both parties
enjoy an outside option normalized to zero.
- T = 2. Uncertainty resolves and a communication game takes place within each ￿rm: managers
report their private information, set prices and product market competition takes place.
- T=3. Pro￿ts materialize, shareholders audit managers, dividends and punishments (if any)
are collected.
Since contracts are secret, the equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) with
a ￿passive beliefs￿re￿nement: given an equilibrium where shareholders of ￿rm i o⁄er the contract
3Ce
i (i = 1;::n), when manager i is o⁄ered an unexpected contract, say C0
i 6= Ce
i , he believes that
rivals are o⁄ered the same contracts ￿ i.e., Cj = Ce
j for every j 6= i. I shall look for symmetric fully
separating equilibria: ￿rms with the same cost charge the same ￿nal price ￿ i.e., pi (￿i) = pj (￿j)





as long as ￿i 6= ￿0
i.
Let pe (￿i) be ￿rm i￿ s equilibrium price in state ￿i. Consider then ￿rm i setting pi given that its
neighbors charge the equilibrium prices pe (￿j), with j 2 fi + 1;i ￿ 1g. The location of the consumer
that is indi⁄erent between purchasing from ￿rm i or its neighbor i + 1, say x(pi;pe(e ￿i+1)), is then
de￿ned by the indi⁄erence condition











By symmetry, ￿rm i￿ s expected demand is then
X
j2fi+1;i￿1g
Ee ￿j[x(pi;pe(e ￿j))] =
X
j2fi+1;i￿1g








where b pe =Ee ￿j[pe(e ￿j)] is the average equilibrium price. Manager i￿ s utility is linear in wealth:
U (￿i;mi) = Ee ￿i+1;e ￿i￿1[Ui (￿i;mij￿i+1;￿i￿1)] = Qi (pi (mi); b pe)(pi (mi) ￿ ￿i)￿Di (mi)￿￿i (mi)Pi (￿i);
given state ￿i and report mi. Shareholders are risk-neutral and maximize the expected dividend
Ee ￿i[Di(e ￿i)].
I will make the following hypothesis:
A1 The random variable e ￿i takes values ￿ = 1 + ￿ and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ with equal probability. It has
standard deviation ￿ 2 [0;1], expected value 1, and support ￿￿ = 2￿. The monitoring cost is
quadratic: c(￿) =  e2=2 with   > 0.
So that e ￿i re￿ ects an idiosyncratic shock to each ￿rm, while ￿ measures industry-wide uncer-
tainty. Results will be derived for ￿ small to avoid corner solutions.
3 Complete information benchmark
When shareholders observe the cost realization of their own manager, but not those of the rivals￿
managers, the result is straightforward;












Since ￿rms￿sales pro￿ts are convex in prices, greater uncertainty makes entry more pro￿table.
4 Asymmetric information
Consider now asymmetric information. I look for a symmetric separating equilibrium of the game
where: (i) shareholders o⁄er contracts inducing truthful revelation by managers and that are best
response one to another; (ii) managers participate the game and truthfully report their types; (iii)
the equilibrium number of ￿rms is determined by the shareholders￿(expected) zero pro￿t condition.
This equilibrium outcome must satisfy few standard requirements.
First, manager i accepts contract Ci if and only its participation constraint is met:
Ui (￿i) = Qi (pi (￿i); b pe)(pi (￿i) ￿ ￿i) ￿ Di (￿i) ￿ ￿i (￿i)Pi (￿i) ￿ 0; 8 ￿i 2 ￿: (1)
Moreover, he truthfully reports its type as long as Ci satis￿es incentive compatibility, i.e.,
Ui (￿i) ￿ Qi (pi (mi); b pe)(pi (mi) ￿ ￿i) ￿ Di (mi) ￿ ￿i (mi)Pi (￿i); 8 mi 6= ￿i: (2)
Finally, since managers are protected by limited liability, the punishment Pi (￿i) needs to satisfy
the condition
Di (mi) + Pi (￿i) ￿ Qi (pi (mi); b pe)(pi (mi) ￿ ￿i); 8 mi 6= ￿i; (3)
implying that at the most the ￿rm cash ￿ ow can be seized by shareholders when a lie is detected.










Standard techniques allow to show (see, e.g., La⁄ont and Martimort, 2000) that the relevant
incentive constraint is that of e¢ cient types, i.e.,
Ui ￿ Ui + ￿￿Qi (pi; b pe) ￿ ￿iPi: (4)
More e¢ cient managers mimic ine¢ cient ones simply because, by doing so, they save on production
costs at the shareholders￿expense. Hence, limited liability implies
Pi ￿ Ui + ￿￿Qi (pi; b pe): (5)
Not that, in equilibrium there is no need to audit a manager who claims to be e¢ cient ￿ i.e.,
￿
i = 0. This is because the ine¢ cient type￿ s incentive constraint is slack and auditing is costly.
5Finally, as standard, ine¢ cient managers get no rents (Ui = 0) so that the punishment Pi in the
ine¢ cient state is irrelevant. Di⁄erently, the punishment Pi in the e¢ cient state is the largest
possible given (5), i.e.,






￿￿Qi (pi; b pe):
This expression determines the information rent as a function of two endogenous variables: the
monitoring intensity ￿i and the price pi charged in the ine¢ cient state. The cost of inducing
managers to tell the truth decreases the larger is the monitoring intensity (high ￿i) and the smaller
is ￿rm i￿ s expected demand in state ￿. To reduce this rent shareholders will: (i) monitor managers
claiming to be ine¢ cient with positive probability; (ii) distort upward relative to the complete
information case the price pi.
Each principal￿ s objective is therefore:
max
pi(:);￿i
Ee ￿i[Qi(pi(e ￿i); b pe)(pi(e ￿i) ￿e ￿i)] ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿
e
)￿￿Qi (pi; b pe) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)c(￿i):
Optimizing with respect to prices and monitoring intensity, a symmetric equilibrium is identi￿ed
by the ￿rst-order conditions
@Qi(pe; b pe)
@pi
(pe ￿ ￿) + Qi(pe; b pe) = 0; (6)
















￿￿Qi (pe; b pe) = c0(￿
e
): (8)
As standard, low-cost managers price according to the e¢ cient rule, (expected) marginal rev-
enues equalize marginal costs as stated by equation (6). High cost managers, instead, are forced
to set prices according to an ine¢ cient rule as implied by equation (7): shareholders realize that
the information rent of the e¢ cient manager is larger the higher is demand when he mimics, so
they request a larger price in the bad state to reduce this rent. Finally, equation (8) states that
the monitoring intensity is chosen so as to equalize marginal costs to marginal bene￿ts, which are
captured by the negative impact of a tighter control on rents.
The free entry condition is:
Ee ￿i[Qi(pe(e ￿i); b pe)(pe(e ￿i) ￿e ￿i)]
| {z }
Sales pro￿ts
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿
e
)￿￿Qi (pe; b pe)
| {z }
Expected rents








6This condition simply states that in a competitive equilibrium shareholders equalize sales pro￿ts
to total costs, which include managerial rents, monitoring costs and entry costs.
Using the parametric speci￿cation in A1 and taking ￿ small, the solution of the system of
equations (6)-(9) implies:














@￿2 = sign(  ￿ F):















Larger cost volatility has two countervailing e⁄ects on entry. First, greater uncertainty increases
the average price and this encourages entry because sales pro￿ts are convex in prices. Second, greater
uncertainty spurs the information rents that owners need to give up in order to induce truthful
information revelation. These greater rents sti￿ e pro￿ts thereby making entry less pro￿table.
Which e⁄ect prevails depends on the relative magnitude of entry and monitoring costs. If the
entry cost (F) is larger than the monitoring cost ( ), the rent e⁄ect dominates, greater uncertainty
spurs information rents and entry becomes more costly: shareholders get lower returns from their
sunk investment. Conversely, if the monitoring cost is larger than the entry cost, the price e⁄ect
dominates. This is because, when monitoring is very costly shareholders have little direct control
on their managers: the only way to reduce the costly information rents is to distort upward the
price in the bad state. This magni￿es the equilibrium price dispersion and therefore strengthens
the positive e⁄ect of uncertainty on entry.
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